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PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Senate Bill 106 was proposed during the 2018 General Assembly Session to address
redistricting in anticipation of the 2020 U.S. Census and 2021 redistricting process in Virginia.
Redistricting is done at the state level by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor.
In the past, redistricting efforts have shown to favor of incumbents in the state and are less
competitive. The Voting Rights Act is broad, which has allowed states to interpret and assess
competitiveness in legislative districts differently. The current Virginia map shows a state that
favors one party over the other, and appears to pack minority voters into certain districts, which
the Appeals Court in Bethune-Hill v Virginia State Board of Elections (2018) ultimately
determined was illegal. This report explores options for optimizing minority voting power and
increasing opportunity for minority representation in the Virginia legislature.
LEGISLATION OVERVIEW
Redistricting in the Commonwealth
Virginia has historically used redistricting to dilute minority voting power through “cracking” and
“packing”. Cracking involves splitting communities amongst many majority-white districts to
eliminate minority voting power. Packing places as many minority votes as possible into one
district, to minimize the number of sears that minorities could win control (Levitt, 2018). In 2013,
Shelby County v. Holder invalidated the preclearance requirement, meaning redistricting bills no
longer require review by the Department of Justice, and litigation is the only way to challenge
redistricting. Prior to 2013, Virginia’s redistricting plans were subject to review by the
Department of Justice as per Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to address a history of
discrimination against minority voters (Pierce & Rabinowitz, 2017). The Voting Rights Act
required Virginia to adhere to “preclearance”, requiring any changes made to legislative or
congressional districts to be reviewed by the Department of Justice. Virginia was identified as
one of the “preclearance” states by a formula that took into account voter turnout statistics and
use of voter suppression devices such as literacy tests or voter identification (Cable, 2013).
Lawsuits have been filed in response to 2013. In Bethune-Hill v Virginia State Board of Elections
(2018), the Supreme Court instructed the district court to reexamine current legislative maps for
evidence of racial bias and gerrymandered districts that dilute the impact of African American
voters (Barnes and Schneider, 2017). In June 2018, the district court ruled that 11 of the state
legislative districts had been subject to racial gerrymandering and needed to be redrawn by
October 30, 2018 (Levitt, 2018).
Several proposals have been put forth by members of both the Democratic and Republican
parties to redraw the legislative districts before October 30, 2018; however, there has been
widespread disagreement on how the lines are to be drawn. The federal court has appointed a

special expert to redraw state legislative districts by March 28, 2019 due to the impasse among
the legislature (Associated Press, 2018).
SB106 is a redistricting bill, focused on setting forth new criteria for congressional and
legislative districts. It requires the following criteria be considered in drawing districts:
population, requirements of state and federal law, existing political boundaries, contiguous and
compact territory, and communities of interest.
Goals and Implementation
One of the main goals for SB106 was to address issues of compactness. While compactness
was not specifically defined in the legislation, SB106 stipulated that the General Assembly must
provide numerical measures of individual and average district compactness to provide an
“objective assessment.” Compactness is generally understood to mean how regular in shape a
district is and how close a district’s boundaries are to its geographic center (Kaufman, 2018).
The more certain areas protrude from the rest of the district, the less compact the district
becomes. The latest boundary lines drawn from the 2010 census redistricting effort, split up
many localities (Smith, 2018). Senator David Suetterlein noted in a committee hearing that his
own district split up many communities in Southwest Virginia and he wanted to address the
issue of compactness through SB106 (Suetterlein, 2018). Members of the Virginia Legislative
Black Caucus and Governor Ralph Northam have expressed concerns that the bill did not go far
enough in protecting minority votes. (Office of the Governor, 2018). Governor Northam stated
that criteria should “prohibit districts that favor or disfavor any political party, incumbent
legislator, member of Congress or individual or entity”.
Existing procedures for redistricting rely on magistrates and local governments to update
districts for their constituents without a central statewide mapping system. According to the
Department of Elections, the state does not have a central mapping system to help verify that
voters are in the correct districts. SB 106 was seeking to establish more equitable approach to
the redrawing of the boundaries that does not dilute communities of interest voters.
Communities of interest is defined by SB 106 as homogeneous neighborhoods or separate
groups of people living in an area with similar interests or needs in transportation, employment,
or culture. Racial and ethnic minorities are not explicitly defined as communities of interest, and
leaves the redistricting process at risk for “race-blind” strategies that leave historically
marginalized and disenfranchised communities without a voice due to dilution across multiple
districts. The Republicans currently control the House and Senate and could therefore control
the legislature for the 2020 redistricting. Without the Department of Justice intervening, it
remains to be seen how the legislative districts will be drawn.
Redistricting: Understanding the Players
Redistricting was last revisited in Virginia in 2011 with HB 5005, supported by both Republicans
and Democrats. HB 5005 intended to provide objective criteria for redistricting to create
competitive congressional and legislative districts in the Commonwealth. However, neither
party, regardless of who is in power, has taken steps to completely ensure this (Levitt, 2018).
Lines have been drawn to keep certain candidates from having competitive elections, effectively
keeping their power over that district. Incumbents are less likely to change boundary lines due
to name recognition with their voters and assumed continued voter loyalty (Levitt, 2018).
Virginia’s elections appear to be less competitive. Specifically, state House and Senate districts
have become less contested overtime since 1997. Additionally, efforts to maintain existing
majority-minority districts may lead to decreased competitiveness and increased incumbency

advantage in adjacent districts (Forgette et al., 2009). The lack of competitiveness is a concern,
since voter preferences may change over time, and current incumbents may not represent
current voter preferences. Studies show that voter turnout is higher when voters perceive that
an election is competitive (Levitt, 2018). Virginia voters may be dissuaded from voting since few
districts are deemed competitive.
1

Many interest groups generally support redistricting efforts in Virginia. Brian Cannon, Executive
Director of OneVirginia2021, expressed support for SB 106 as a step forward in redistricting
reform. Of the supporters for redistricting reform, many were committed to the intent to address
compactness, as it is a requirement of the Virginia State Constitution (Joachim, 2018; Wilson,
2018). The state Republican Party had widespread support for the bill in the Senate and House,
with all Senate members voting for the bill, and the majority of Republican members in the
House.
Opponents of the legislation included several Democratic members of the legislature and the
state and national Democratic Party. Senator George Barker (D - 39th District) opposed the bill
due to the prioritization of political subdivisions, and emphasized the need for legal and fair
determination of boundaries with a focus on the Commonwealth as whole, not individual
subdivisions (Iowkell, 2018). Similarly, Senator Jennifer McClellan (D – 9th District) opposed the
bill because it prioritized political subdivisions and boundaries, but did not hold communities of
interest sacrosanct. She also believed it was premature to move forward with legislation while
federal cases regarding the use of race in drawing district boundaries are under deliberation
(Iowkell, 2018).
Racial Disparity: Minority Participation and Representation
Virginia has seen a change in its demographic makeup, with Black, non-Hispanic Asian and
Hispanic populations projected to grow by 2040 and constitute more than half of the population
(VPAP, 2017). Virginia is also aging fast; one in five Virginians will be over 65 years by 2030
(Sen, 2017). With changing demographics, election competitiveness will also change over time.
Incumbents from well-rounded districts will need to shift from traditional partisan approaches to
coalition building around shared values in order to remain competitive among an increasingly
diverse electorate. The 2017 election produced some very close races, sending more women,
Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans to the Virginia state legislature than in years past.
However, there is room for additional progress to make the legislature more representative of
the electorate. Virginia’s electorate is about 50% female, 60% Caucasian with a median age of
45, and nearly 40% are college graduates, whereas state legislators skew male (>70%), older
(55yo), and are predominantly Caucasian (80%+) college graduates (>80%) (Figure 1).
Historically, in order to diversify legislatures and get minorities elected, majority-minority districts
have been used as a primary solution.
Throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s, districts needed to be 50% or more African American for
the favored candidate to win, but now in an increasingly diverse state, 40-45% representation
may be sufficient (Pildes, 2002). In 2016, 50 of the 96 minority members elected to the House
came from districts with no racial majority or a white majority (Wasserman, 2018). The
campaigns of minority candidates across the U.S., who are increasingly winning in districts that
are not dominated by one minority group, highlight the opportunity for a diverse electorate to
form interracial political coalitions to elect minority candidates (Pildes, 2002; Wasserman, 2018).
League of Women Voters, Rotary Clubs, Tea Party supporters, AAUW, the Virginia Municipal League,
OneVirginia2021, Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc. and the NAACP.
1

Current evidence shows that the process of redistricting has a statistically significant impact on
the political participation rates of African Americans (Hayes & McKee, 2012). There are
significant information costs with redistricting that impact African-American voter turnout, in part
due to socioeconomic factors (Hayes & McKee, 2012). Specifically, redrawn citizens are less
likely to be able to identify their incumbent and this lack of familiarity with their representative
produces higher non-voting rates in congressional contests (Hayes & McKee, 2012).

Figure 1

RACIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS
Research has shown that an independent redistricting commission would increase competition
and create better outcomes for minority voters (Carson & Crespin, 2004). According to The
Virginia Public Access Project (VPAP), Virginia House and Senate districts have become less
contested overtime. An efficiency gap analysis was done on all congressional and state
legislative elections to determine whether a political party may have won, widened, or retained
its grip on power through political gerrymandering and found that Virginia leaned more
2
Republican after election results (Lieb, 2017). According to the Princeton Gerrymandering

2

The formula compares the statewide average share of the vote a party receives in each district with the statewide percentage of
seats it wins, taking into account a common political expectation: For each 1 percentage point gain in its statewide vote share, a

Project, Republicans held a statistical consistent advantage and were favored to win more seats
during the 2017 legislative district elections. Virginia’s legislative districts have been statistically
shown to be less competitive and in favor of one political party over the other. Redistricting in
Virginia is inherently a political process that benefits incumbents (Betts, 2001). It has reduced
community engagement, minority voter participation, and competitiveness. As such, studies
have shown that outcomes for minorities and competitiveness are increased when redistricting
happens at the court level or with independent redistricting commissions (Betts, 2001). In order
to fully understand the possible outcomes in states that use redistricting commissions, this
report will look at California and Arizona.
Three criteria will be used to evaluate the three states. Competitiveness will be looked at in
terms of margin of victory of the last state legislative elections and term limits of legislators. A
percentage point of 10% or less for margin of victory will be considered to be more competitive
(McGhee, 2018). Any races considered to have a margin of victory above 10% will be
considered to be not competitive. Secondly, minority voter participation will be measured by
percentage of minorities who cast vote in the last legislative election for the respective states.
Finally, minority voter engagement will be evaluated by minority participation in the redistricting
process.
Arizona
Arizona instituted an independent redistricting commission through Arizona Proposition 106, a
constitutional amendment on the ballot in 2001 (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,
2001). The commission consists of two Republicans and two Democrats who are selected by
state party leaders (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 2001). There is also one
independent commissioner who is selected by Democrats and Republicans on the commission.
Certain criteria must be followed when drawing the maps, starting with a basic grid map,
showing no previous district boundaries. The redistricting commission has faced challenges in
court by the Arizona legislature, claiming that the commission did not have the authority to
redraw the maps (Loyola Law School, n.d.). The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the
commission was legally able to draw the boundaries (Brennan Center for Justice, 2015).
Arizona’s independent redistricting commission holds rounds of public hearings on proposed
legislative maps in different regions of the state (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,
2001). The five-member commission holds regular meetings open to the public, posting all
minutes, documents, and transcripts online, thus facilitating an open, transparent process.
Despite the number of public hearings and meetings held by the commission, minority voter
participation in subsequent elections has remained low and has decreased over time
(Daugherty & Garcia, 2018). African American participation in elections decreased by nine
percent and Hispanics by 14% between 2010 to 2014.
Arizona has a high turnover rate that has risen since the passage of term limits in 1993
(Berman, 2004). Legislators serve two year terms with term limits of up to four (National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2018). Term limits however have had little to no effect on
minorities represented in the state legislature, with the exception of Hispanics, possibly due to
changes in population (Berman, 2004). House districts elect two candidates from each district
which makes it difficult to compare margin of victory. For the purposes of this analysis, only the
Arizona senate elections will be used for comparison. The last legislative elections in Arizona
party normally increases its seat share by 2 percentage points. So a party that receives 55% of the statewide vote could expect to
win 60 % of the legislative seats.

occurred in 2016. Almost 50% of the Arizona state senate candidates went unopposed in the
election (13/30 races). Despite having an independent redistricting commission and term limits,
Arizona appears to have few competitive districts. The districts compared against the United
States actually fair more competitive than other states on average (Soffen, 2015).

Arizona
Senate 2014
Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

30

30

5

4 Districts

26 Districts

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

30

30

12

4 Districts

26 Districts

Senate 2016

Source: Arizona Secretary of State. (2016, November 29). State of Arizona Official Canvass General Election, November 8, 2016. Retrieved
October 24, 2018, from https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2016/General/Official%20Signed%20State%20Canvass.pdf

California
California instituted an independent redistricting commission in 2008 (Loyola Law School, n.d.).
The 14 commission seats are appointed without legislative involvement, and are divided almost
evenly between registered Democrats, Republicans, and Independents (McGhee, 2018). The
members are not allowed to be involved with politics and are required to have an open,
transparent process. The independent redistricting commission hold 30 public meetings before
the maps were drawn and 30 public meetings after the maps are drawn (Shupe, 2018). The
state became a majority-minority state after the 2000 U.S. Census but has seen less
participation from African Americans, Hispanics and Asian Americans (Baldassare et al., 2018).
Efforts through the Irvine Foundation and other interest groups have worked to ensure that
multiple voices, including those of minorities, were included in the commission’s redistricting
process (James Irvine Foundation, 2010).
California state senators serve four-year terms with a two-term limit, and California assembly
members serve for two years with a three-term limit (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2018). Since term limits were passed in 1990, the legislature has seen more representation by
minorities (Cain, & Kousser, 2004). In 2014 only four races in the assembly went uncontested
(California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, 2014). In 2016, the competitiveness of the
assembly districts decreased, with 14 races having a 16% or less margin of victory. The number
of competitive senate races increased to 20% with five districts with a 16% or less margin of
victory (California Research Bureau, 2016).
Despite California becoming a majority-minority state, there is still a disparity in minority voter
participation in state legislative elections. Non-Hispanic whites make up 42% of the state’s adult
population, but constitute about 59% of the state’s likely voters (Baldassare et al., 2018).
According to the Public Policy Institute of California, 50% of Asian American adult citizens, 53%

of Hispanic adult citizens, and 58% of African American adult citizens are likely to vote,
compared to 75% of white adult citizens. Minority voter participation is down, similar to Arizona,
however California appears to have more contested elections and more competitive elections.

California
Senate 2014
Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

40

20

0

5 Districts

15 Districts

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

40

20

0

5 Districts

15 Districts

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

80

80

4

14

66

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

80

80

2

12

68

Senate 2016

House 2014

House 2016

Source: California Secretary of State Alex Padilla. (2016). Statement of Vote November 8, 2016, General Election. Retrieved
October 24, 2018, from https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/2016-complete-sov.pdf

Virginia
Virginia has open public committee meetings for passage of redistricting bills and maps during
the General Assembly session. Six public hearings were held around the state in 2010, prior to
the 2011 General Assembly session, conducted by the house committee on privileges and
elections (Cole, 2010). Then Governor, Bob McDonnell created an Independent Advisory
Commission which held four public meetings across the Commonwealth, to gather input on the
redistricting process (Independent Bipartisan Advisory Commission on Redistricting
Commonwealth of Virginia. (2011). The commission found that transparency and the splitting of
precincts for legislative districts were of concern from members of the public.
Members of the Virginia Senate serve four years with no term limits and members of the House
of Delegates serve for two years with no term limits (Va. Const, art. IV §§ 2 & 3). In the 2015
Senate and House of Delegates elections, 79 seats went uncontested, all of whom were

incumbents. This presents a challenge in those districts for competitiveness since there are no
term limits and fewer candidates entering the race. Redistricting takes place in the Virginia
General Assembly redistricting committee in each house. The house of delegates committee
consists of four Republicans and two Democrats, and the senate committee consists of three
Republicans and five Democrats (VA General Assembly, 2011). HB 5005 was the last
redistricting bill passed in 2011, which set forth the current legislative boundaries. In 2017, the
number of uncontested seats in the House went down from 62 to 33 seats (Virginia Department
of Elections, 2018). The number of seats increased in competitiveness and less seats went
uncontested, bringing Virginia in line with Arizona and California in having about 20% or more
seats competitive.

Virginia
Senate 2015
Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

40

40

17

6 Districts

34 Districts

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

40

2

0

1 Districts

1 Districts

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

100

100

62

3

97

Total Seats

Available Seats

# Unopposed

Competitive
( ≤ 5%-10%)

Non-Competitive
(≥10%)

100

100

33

22

78

Senate 2017

House 2015

House 2017

Source: Virginia Department of Elections. (2018). Virginia Elections Database » Search Elections. Retrieved October 29, 2018,
from http://historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/search/year_from:2017/year_to:2017/office_id:9/stage:General.

Minority voter participation in Virginia is consistent with Arizona and California; it is significantly
lower than non-Hispanic white voters (Krogstad & Lopez, 2017). According to the U.S. Census,
African American voter participation rates decreased from 62% to 55.9% from 2012 to 2016, but
Hispanic voter participation remained stagnant at about 31% (U.S. Census, 2018). These
statistics are troubling considering about 36% of the total Virginia population belongs to a racial
or ethnic minority and the state is projected to be a majority-minority state by 2040 (VPAP,

2017). Considering the turnout rate of minorities, especially African Americans is lower than the
population total in the state, it is concerning that the Virginia General Assembly may not
necessarily reflect the preferences of minority groups in Virginia. Figure 1 shows the current
makeup of the General Assembly in relation to population trends of the state.
RECOMMENDATIONS
During the 2018 General Assembly session, over 20 bills related to redistricting were
introduced, highlighting the importance of the issue and the legislature’s willingness to consider
strategies for improving the process. However, there are differing approaches to redistricting,
specific to the criteria used for redistricting and the persons involved in the final decisions.
Therefore, in order to best use redistricting to maximize the voting power of communities of
color, we have three key recommendations.
Recommendation 1: Optimize community voices through community engagement
Best practices identified from community driven redistricting, such as the one in Oakland,
California, include an open, transparent process with community meetings targeting young
people, immigrants, people of color and other traditionally marginalized groups (Oakland Votes
Redistricting Commission, 2014). Virginia should intentionally employ an open, transparent
process of community engagement that equips the community with the tools to create maps that
allow them to self-define their communities. In order to mobilize communities of color to
participate in redistricting events, engagement strategies akin to those used for voter
registration and get out the vote initiatives (door knocking, calling community members,
emailing) and engagement key community brokers should all be employed. These efforts to
engage the community in the redistricting process will allow for the process to (1) become more
transparent; (2) provide more opportunities for communities of interest to express the needs and
desires of their respective communities; and (3) foster a greater sense of inclusion in the
process.
Recommendation 2: Establishing a Non-Partisan Solution to Redistricting
Across the nation, seven states use independent commissions to draw congressional districts
and 13 use independent commissions to establish state legislative district boundaries. The
General Assembly is showing signs of creating a possible redistricting commission independent
from the legislative body under SJ 25, a resolution introduced in 2018 and is anticipated to be
re-introduced in 2019. This resolution seeks to create a seven-member bipartisan appointed
commission. Poll results suggest there is public support for putting the redistricting process into
the hands of an independent redistricting commission. A recent poll conducted by the Judy Ford
Wason Center for Public Policy at Christopher Newport University found that over 60% of
Virginians would support a state constitutional amendment to institute a nonpartisan redistricting
commission (Joachim, 2018). Given this public support for an independent redistricting
commission, the General Assembly should consider moving forward with SJ 25. Multiple
stakeholder groups have expressed support for the creation of an independent commission built
on non-partisan criteria that would use Census data and community input to develop state
legislative and congressional maps (Albiges, 2018).
Recommendation 3: Unpack majority minority districts
Unpacking majority-minority districts provides greater opportunity for minorities to build diverse
coalitions with like-minded voters. In the short-term, this process can begin with the
development of remedy maps that resolve the racial gerrymander deemed present in 11 House

of Delegate districts. Addressing racial gerrymandering is anticipated to (1) influence districts
where the voting age population of minorities will increase such that incumbents must
intentionally engage with this community in order to be reelected; and (2) challenge districts
where the voting age population of minorities will substantially increase, creating opportunity for
a minority primary challenger. In the long-term, redistricting efforts beginning 2021, using 2020
Census data, should not establish a specific minority voting age population threshold for the
creation of district boundaries (i.e. >55% African American voting age population). Instead,
respect for geographic boundaries (such as counties and voting precincts) and communities of
interest, that specifically indicate racial and ethnic minorities, should be considered. It would be
reasonable to consider the creation of smaller precincts in order to give voters more options and
to optimize voting numbers.
CONCLUSION
Since the founding of the country, the voting power of communities of color has been in
contention. While the Supreme Court has confirmed that voting is a fundamental political right
and all voters are equal, there remain barriers to voting that disproportionately impact African
Americans, Hispanics, young voters, low wage earners, and people with disabilities (Lieberman,
2012). Voting barriers include restrictions to voter registration, absentee and early voting, voter
identification, voter purging, and rights restoration. Virginia currently requires photo identification
at the polls and multiple bills were forwarded in the 2018 General Assembly session either to
revoke or to increase the stringency of photo identification requirements. Virginia is making
progress in regards to rights restoration for formerly incarcerated persons, however, redistricting
remains a prime opportunity to further optimize the voting power of Virginia’s minority
communities. SB 106 proposed criteria to guide the redistricting process in anticipation of the
2020 Census. Nationally, we have seen other states take on the challenge of a fair, open and
transparent redistricting process, by centering not just the criteria for drawing the district lines
but the persons in charge of process. In particular, states that implement redistricting well,
engage communities that have historically been marginalized. Virginia is poised to follow suit.
During the 2018 General Assembly session, legislators forwarded several pieces of legislation,
such as SJ 25, seeking to establish an independent, bipartisan redistricting commission.
While an independent redistricting commission is an approach proven to enhance competition
and create better outcomes for minority voters, this inherently political process requires
community engagement in order to truly reflect community priorities (Carson & Crespin, 2004).
Intentional outreach to communities of color and equipping them with the skills to draw maps will
optimize their voting power. Instead of being locked out of critical conversations, communities of
color will direct the conversations and have a greater chance of electing candidates of their
choosing. Furthermore, by unpacking majority-minority districts and collaborating with politically
like-minded voters across multi-racial coalitions, communities of color will not suffer dilution of
their voting power.
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Define: Redistricting
The process of drawing electoral district boundaries
in the United States. Because districts may change
demographically and populations too, district
boundaries are redrawn every 10 years. This should
ensure that the districts are reflective and
representative of the electorate.
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Redistricting
Compactness
Gerrymandering
Cracking
Packing
Communities of Interest
Contiguity

Define: Compactness
Generally understood to mean how regular in shape a
district is and how close a district’s boundaries are to its
geographic center.
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Define: Gerrymandering

Define: Cracking
• “Cracking" -Diluting the
voting power of a group
across many districts

• The manipulation of
district lines to protect
or change political
power.
• Maps drawn in a way
that disadvantages racial
or ethnic minorities

• Historically this technique
was used to spread
members of minority
communities across
districts and prevent
election of candidates of
color

• One political party using
unilateral ability to pass a
map to lock in a
disproportionate share of
seats

• Voting Rights Act of 1965
allowed for creation of
majority minority districts to
remedy this practice
Source: Azavea

Define: Communities of Interest

Define: Packing
• “Packing“- Concentrating
the members of a group in
one district, which
reduces their voting
power in other districts

These are groups of individuals who are likely to have
similar legislative concerns, and who might therefore
benefit from cohesive representation in the legislature.
• 24 states consider various communities in defining
district boundaries, criteria include
• Racial, ethnic, social, cultural, Indian
reservations, historic interests
• Geographical, regional, county, municipal or
voting precinct boundaries
• Partisan, voting trends, incumbency

• Fine line between
concentrated districts
(majority minority) to
ensure minority
representation and super
concentrated or packed
districts that dilute the
minority community’s
voting power in
surrounding districts
Source: Azavea

Overview: The Voting Rights Act
of 1965

Define: Contiguity
Single, unbroken shape. Like compactness,
contiguity is considered one of the "traditional"
redistricting principles.
Non
contiguous
shape
Non
contiguous
shape

• Outlawed the discriminatory voting practices adopted in many
southern states after the Civil War, including literacy tests as
a prerequisite to voting
• The Voting Rights Act is broad, which has allowed states to
interpret differently and affect competitiveness in legislative
districts
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Overview: Preclearance

Overview: Voter Suppression

• Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
• Prior to 2013, Virginia redistricting plans were subject to
review by the Department of Justice
• The Supreme Court Case Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 2 (2013), invalidated the preclearance requirement
until after a redistricting bill becomes a law
• Litigation is currently the only way to challenge
proposed redistricting bills

• In the absence of strong enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act, multipronged strategies aimed at voter
suppression have been attempted, most centering on
voter identification and voter registration
• Examples
• Senate Bill 523- Photo ID in poll books
• House Bill 1598- Require Proof of Citizenship
• House Bill 1428- Require Photo ID for
phone/email/mail Absentee Voting

Overview: Gerrymandering

Overview: Virginia Current State

• Bethune-Hill v. VA State Board of Elections (2018)
found that 11 of 100 House districts created in 2011
were illegally gerrymandered based on race

Overview: Virginia Current State
• Virginia has 11 congressional districts. Seven are
Republican-held, with Democratic incumbents in the
remaining four. Three Republican-held seats are highly
competitive; one of those, the 10th district, actually
leans toward the Democratic nominee.

• Current Virginia map shows a state that favors one
party over the other
• Appears to pack minority voters into certain districts
(Appeals court in Bethune-Hill case determined this
was ILLEGAL)

Overview: Senate Bill 106 (SB 106)
•

Proposed by Senator Suetterlein during the 2018
General Assembly Session

•

Focused on setting forth new criteria for
congressional and legislative districts

•

Ensuring redrawing did not dilute communities of
interest

•

Virginia has historically used redistricting to dilute
minority voting power through cracking and packing

•

Vetoed by Governor 5/18/18
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Understanding the Players
• Supporters- One Step toward Improvement
• Interest Groups
• Virginia Municipal League, League of Women Voters,
OneVirginia2021, NAACP

• Republicans in Virginia State Senate and
Republicans and Democrats in Virginia State
House of Delegates

• Opponents- Lack of Focus on Communities of
Interest
• Democrats in Virginia State Senate & National
Democratic Party

Racial Disparity: Minority
Participation and Representation
• Virginia’s electorate is about 50% female, 60%
Caucasian with a median age of 45 and nearly
40% are college graduates
• State legislators skew male (>70%), older (55yo),
and are predominantly Caucasian (80%+) college
graduates (>80%)

Racial Disparity: Minority
Participation and Representation
• Electorate is changing
• By 2040, 50% VA population will be black, non
Hispanic Asian or Hispanic
• By 2030, 1 in 5 Virginians will be over 65
• Legislature is changing
• 2017 election, competitive, sent more women, Asian
Americans and Hispanic Americans to the Virginia
state legislature than in years past
• Opportunity for interracial, political coalition building
and shift away from majority minority districts
• 1960s-1980s, districts needed to be 50% or more
African American for the favored candidate to win
• In 2016, 50 of the 96 minority members elected to
the U.S. House came from districts with no racial
majority or a white majority

Trends We’ve Noticed

States with Current Independent
Redistricting Commissions

• Minority voter participation is down
• Independent Redistricting Commissions have been
known to create more competitive districts
• Engagement with Communities of Interest,
especially minority groups involves them in
redistricting process and has better outcomes for
more competitive districts and less minority packing
and cracking
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Independent Redistricting
Commissions

Polling Shows Public Support of
IRC

• 5 states use independent commissions as
advisory to the state legislature
• 13 states use independent commissions solely for
legislative & congressional boundaries
• SJ 25- possible independent commission (7
member)
• Introduced during 2018 session in Virginia
• Will be reintroduced in 2019

• Survey results indicate voters prefer non-partisan
efforts for redistricting
• Ensure balanced representation of political
affiliation

Racial Impact Analysis
• Determine whether having an Independent
Redistricting Commission increases
• Minority voter participation
• Community engagement with minorities
• Competitiveness
• States used for analysis:
• Arizona-Republican Leaning
• California-Democratic Leaning
• Both have a high population of minorities and
Independent redistricting commissions

Margin of Victory: A Measure of
Competitiveness in Arizona 2014

State Analysis: Arizona
• Independent Redistricting Commission established in
2001
• 5 seats (2 Republican, 2 Democrat, 1 Independent
Chair)
• Legislature has term limits
• Despite this, has less minority representatives in
office
• 30 Senate seats, 60 House seats
• Low Minority voter participation
• Commission held 21 public meetings before maps were
drawn

Margin of Victory: A Measure of
Competitiveness in Arizona 2016
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State Analysis: California

Margin of Victory: A Measure of
Competitiveness in California 2014

• Independent Redistricting Commission (2008)
• 14 seats almost even amongst Democrats,
Republicans & Independents
• Legislature not allowed to appoint representatives
• Term Limits
• More minority representation overtime since IRC was
enacted
• 40 Senate seats, 80 House seats
• Disparity in minority voter participation despite being
majority minority state
• Commission held 30 public meetings before maps were
drawn and 30 meetings after maps were drawn

Margin of Victory: A Measure of
Competitiveness in California 2016

State Analysis: Virginia
•
•
•
•
•
•

Margin of Victory: A Measure of
Competitiveness in Virginia 2015

Redistricting conducted by Virginia General Assembly
No term limits (Senate & House)
40 Senate Seats, 100 House of Delegates Seats
Minority voter participation consistent with AZ & CA
VA projected to be majority minority by 2040
House Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections held
six meetings before maps were drawn

Margin of Victory: A Measure of
Competitiveness in Virginia 2017
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Recommendation #1: Optimize Community
Voice through Community Engagement

Concluding Thoughts
• All three states have a low minority voter participation despite
greater engagement in redistricting process such as California
• California and Arizona’s legislative elections appear to be more
competitive than Virginia
• Community engagement is better in California than Arizona and
Virginia

• Minority voter participation is down
• Current redistricting process only includes 6 public
hearings before maps are drawn, no public hearings held
after maps are drawn
• To increase voter participation, must have greater
community outreach with minority groups
• This creates opportunities for minorities to develop their
own maps, self-define their communities and incorporate
their voice into the process

Recommendation #2: Independent
Redistricting Commission
• Virginia’s current redistricting process and no term
limits creates less competitive districts
• Arizona and California show more competitive districts
• In California, there has been an increase in minorities
and women representatives
• The General Assembly should create an independent
redistricting commission to increase competitiveness in
races and produce better outcomes for minorities
• Public support is high for an IRC

Poll Results
80%

Recommendation #3: Unpack
Majority Minority Districts

70%
60%

• Studies show majority minority districts are in effect
keeping more minority representatives from being
elected to office
• In other states, we’re finding that minority representatives
can be elected without a majority minority district
• Unpacking majority minority districts increases competition,

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

VCU

Univ of Mary
Wash

Panel of local & state experts
GA
nonpartisan commission
undecided

Wason Center

voter turnout and may potentially increase number of minority
representatives in General Assembly

bipartisan commission
independent advisory to GA
independent board
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Conclusion

QUESTIONS?

• Independent Redistricting Commission approach
enhances competition and greater representation by
minorities as evidenced in California
• Unpacking majority-minority districts provides greater
opportunity for minorities to work together in coalitions
with like-minded white voters to elect a candidate of their
choice
• Open, transparent process with community meetings
targeting young people, immigrants, people of color and
other traditionally marginalized groups will optimize
minority participation in redistricting process
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